MCAS, ANAB Underwriter Contradictions, And Global Regulatory Questions Facing China, India, And The United States

Rezul News/10735952
Uncertified Root: Worldwide Aviation Danger
A Series Of Unanswered Questions About Accreditation Integrity, Airworthiness Claims, And 24 Years Of Oversight Assumptions.

WASHINGTON - Rezul -- FEATURE PRESS RELEASE

ISO/IEC 17011
, titled "Conformity assessment — Requirements for accreditation bodies (ANAB or (AB) accrediting conformity assessment bodies (Registrars or Certification Bodies (CB) ," establishes that an accreditation body MUST remain completely impartial, independent, and free from any financial interest or liability connected to the organizations it oversees, which is why ANAB cannot legally or ethically function as an underwriter; an underwriter assumes financial risk, guarantees performance, and carries liability, all of which directly violate ISO/IEC 17011's core prohibitions against conflicts of interest, financial entanglement, and compromised neutrality, meaning that if an accreditation body acted as an underwriter, EVERY certificate it touched would be inherently compromised because the body would no longer be a neutral evaluator but a financially invested party. This is inclusive of MRA/MLA equivalent accreditation bodies and effects ALL industries worldwide.

40-Year Quality Expert & Boeing Shareholder, Forensic Accreditation Investigator Daryl Guberman has raised a series of critical questions after discovering that the American National Accreditation Board (ANAB) was identified as an underwriter on a U.S. Department of State 2018 Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131.

Guberman asks as a 40-year quality expert & Boeing shareholder, forensic accreditation Investigator, whether this contradiction may have influenced Boeing's certification environment, the ANAB- Management System Accreditation Committee (MSAC) this board can grant, suspend, or withdraw certification. Boeing sat on this board UNCERTIFIED TO AS9100 for 10 years but overall since April & July 2002 24-YEARS!. Please note: China's CAAC and India's DGCA — both of which function in their countries the same way the FAA functions in the United States.

KEY QUESTIONS RAISED BY GUBERMAN
  • Underwriter Contradiction — Why did no media outlet, legal team, government committee, or regulatory body question ANAB's underwriter designation for more than 10 years (2014-2024)?

  • Boeing's Missing Certification — Why did Boeing require suppliers to obtain AS9100 certification in 2002 to present, while Boeing itself did not hold AS9100?

  • Airworthiness vs. AS9100 — Why has no regulator explained how an FAA airworthiness certificate could supersede AS9100 when AS9100 governs the manufacturing processes that make airworthiness possible?

  • Global Aircraft Conformity — If the accreditation root is questioned, what does that imply for the conformity of aircraft built between 2018 and the present?

  • Supplier Audit Integrity — What does this mean for the thousands of audits suppliers underwent (2018-present) if their registrars relied on an accreditation body listed as an underwriter on a Federal Contract?

  • Regulator Responsibility — How should CAAC-China and DGCA=India evaluate aircraft and components accepted under MRA/MLA (Multi-regional Arrangement/Multil-ateral Arrangement= ANAB equivalence) if the originating accreditation chain is under question?
GLOBAL REGULATORY EXPOSURE

China's CAAC and India's DGCA accepted conformity claims tied to the same accreditation chain now under scrutiny.

Guberman asks as 40-year quality expert & Boeing shareholder, forensic accreditation Investigator, whether these agencies were informed of the underwriter contradiction and whether they were given the opportunity to independently evaluate the accreditation structure before accepting aircraft built under it?

He also raises the question of how many aircraft, components, and systems were accepted by CAAC and DGCA under the assumption that the U.S. accreditation chain was structurally sound?

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Air India 787 Accident Exposes 24 Year Boeing Certification Collapse: FAA Documentation Confirms Risk of In-Flight Engine Shutdown from Faulty Switcheshttps://www.prlog.org/13144403-air-india-787-accident-exposes-24-year-boeing-certification-collapsefaa-documentation-confirms-risk-of-in-flight-engine-shutdown-from-faulty-switches.html

BOEING'S MSAC ROLE AND THE MCAS ERA


Guberman questions how Boeing could hold a voting seat on the Management System Accreditation Committee (MSAC) from 2014 to 2024 while not holding AS9100 certification?

He asks whether this governance role influenced supplier expectations, investor confidence, and global regulatory assumptions during the MCAS era (Ethiopian Airlines 302  & Indonesian airlines Lion Air 610 2018-2019 346 DEAD! ( These aircraft were built in an uncertified AS9100 environment/ But signed off as FLIGHT-WORTHY) — and whether regulators worldwide assumed Boeing's certification environment was intact without verifying the accreditation chain behind it.

GUBERMAN's FEDERAL FILINGS AND OVERSIGHT ACTIONS (MARCH–MAY 2026)

NASA
OIG — Filed 3/17/2026
*DOS OIG — Filed 3/17/2026
GAO FraudNet — Case No. COMP 206082284
*DHS OIG — Filed 3/27/2026
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology — Filed 3/19/2026

DOT OIG — Filed 3/19/2026          DOD OIG — Tracking No. 20240416‑112591
*DOC OIG — Tracking No. 394‑783‑8706
DOE OIG — Filed 3/19/2026
SEC — TCR No. 17742‑876‑499‑149
*FDA — Filed 4/27/2026
*DOJ — Tracking ID 4/9/2026
FAA — Tracking No. MCS‑WJ11‑K66H

These filings establish a documented chain of concern that now intersects directly with global regulatory responsibilities. *DOJ, *DOC, *DHS, *FDA & *DOS are not just members of ANSI-ANAB they are CUSTOMERS.

GLOBAL FORENSIC WARNING: 13- U.S. Federal Agencies Notified as Ten Are Implicated in ANSI–ANAB Governance During Worldwide Accreditation Collapse https://www.prlog.org/13145605-global-forensic-warning-13-us-federal-agencies-notified-as-ten-are-implicated-in-ansianab-governance-during-worldwide-accreditation-collapse.html

GUBERMAN'S POSITION


Following President Donald J. Trump's recent trip to China — and renewed discussions involving Boeing — new, unavoidable questions must now be directed to China's CAAC and India's DGCA regarding aircraft accepted between 2018 and the present.

The core issue is not "compliance."

Compliance means nothing.

The only standard that matters is third‑party AS9100 certification, and Boeing did not have it. 24-YEARS!

Trump Warned as 40‑Year Quality Expert Daryl Guberman Exposes Chinese Control of U.S. Aerospace Oversight https://www.prlog.org/13145917-trump-warned-as-40year-quality-expert-daryl-guberman-exposes-chinese-control-of-us-aerospace-oversight.html

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THE ELIZABETH LUND CONTRADICTION (JUNE 27, 2024)

In a Reuters interview, Elizabeth Lund, then Vice President of Quality for Boeing, publicly stated:
  • Boeing was willing and prepared to obtain AS9100 certification
  • Boeing was compliant with the AS9100 standard
  • Boeing was performing internal audits as if certified
THE 23-YEAR BOEING / ANAB / IAQG FUNNEL ANALYSIS Exposed by Daryl Guberman The Quality Expert Who Uncovered the Largest Industrial & Fiduciary-FRAUD https://www.prlog.org/13116328-the-23-year-boeing-anab-iaqg-funnel-analysis-exposed-by-daryl-guberman-the-quality-expert-who-uncovered-the-largest-industrial-fiduciary-fraud.html

In October 2024, Daryl Guberman personally traveled to Washington State:
  • Everett
  • Renton
  • Auburn
  • Northfield
After nearly a month of employee canvassing, the truth emerged:
  • Employees had no knowledge of AS9100
  • Employees had no knowledge of internal auditing
  • Supervisors routinely denied attendance at safety or audit‑related meetings because
"the plane must move to the next station."

This is the moment the Guberman-Discovery was born.

It revealed why Boeing never obtained AS9100 certification from 2002 to present:

Boeing could not afford to pull people off the line for internal audits, management review, or process verification — all mandatory for third‑party certification.

So, Boeing pretended.

And the FAA, investors, insurers, logistics networks, and the flying public were all carried along by that pretense.

Boeing avoided AS9100 certification intentionally — not Accidentally.

THIRD‑PARTY CERTIFICATION IS THE ROOT — AIRWORTHINESS IS THE FRUIT

China and India must confront a technical truth:

An FAA airworthiness certificate does NOT replace AS9100.
  • AS9100 is the root — it governs materials, heat‑treating, welding, nondestructive testing, hardness testing, and process integrity.
  • Airworthiness is the fruit — it depends entirely on the integrity of the root.
If the root (AS9100 or AI9100(2026) is FRAUDULENT or MISSING— as it is at Boeing — then the fruit is rotten. There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround that can erase the consequences of falsified accreditation under FAA falsification rules.

IF A SUPPLIER HELD A FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATE (2018–PRESENT), EVERY PART THEY PRODUCED IS COMPROMISED


If a supplier providing aluminum, titanium, or any aerospace components to Boeing held a fraudulent AS9100 certificate, then:
  • Every component
  • Every assembly
  • Every structural element
  • Every metallurgical process
is suspect.

China and India may have unknowingly accepted aircraft built with uncertified questionable materials and processes.

THIS IS NOT A WORKFORCE FAILURE — IT IS A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FAILURE (2002–2026)

The machinists, welders, inspectors, and technicians did not cause this.

The failure lies in the management system, which operated without third‑party AS9100 certification while demanding it from suppliers.

METALLURGICAL FAILURE DOES NOT FOLLOW A SCHEDULE

Late‑life failure in aerospace metals can appear:
  • in year five
  • in year ten
  • in year twenty
  • or tomorrow
If the hardness tester, the NDT process, or the heat‑treat certification was fraudulent, the metal cannot be trusted.

And if the metal cannot be trusted, the aircraft cannot be trusted.

THE UNAVOIDABLE QUESTION FOR CHINA AND INDIA

Were the aircraft delivered between 2018 and the present truly third‑party AS9100 certified — or were they accepted under the false assumption that FAA airworthiness "covers" manufacturing integrity?

Because it does not.

AND IT NEVER HAS!

FINAL WORD FROM DARYL GUBERMAN

"Those who forge strength from fraud, will one day be crushed by the weight of their own deception."-
Daryl Guberman-2026

Media Contact
DARYL GUBERMAN
***@yahoo.com
203 556 1493


Source: GUBERMAN-PMC,LLC

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